Happiness research: Past and Future by Veenhoven, R. (Ruut)
1 
HAPPINESS RESEARCH: Past and Future1 
Ruut Veenhoven2 
Senshu Social Well-being Review 2017 (4) 65-74 
ISBN  978 - 4 - 9908234 - 6 - 7
ABSTRACT 
Scholarly interest in happiness peaked in ancient Greek philosophy and during the 
18th century Enlightenment. Interest in the subject revived in the second half of the 
20th century and still mounts today. In this paper, I describe these trends of interest 
in happiness and speculate about the drivers of this development. On this basis, I 
make an educated guess about interest in the future. 
Interest in the good life 
As humans are conscious beings, they have always given thought about the quality 
of their lives. This thought became more systematic after the invention of scripture 
and the development of professional scholarship. Different notions of quality of life 
crystallized, often called by the same name of ‘happiness’. A long-standing 
discussion emerged on the relative importance of these ideas, and on what 
constitutes ‘true happiness’.  
These views on the good life have been described at length in several books 
on the ‘philosophy of happiness’, such as recently in the monumental review by 
McMahon (2006) entitled ‘Happiness: A history’. An overview of this literature is 
available in the ‘Bibliography of Happiness’ (Veenhoven 2017a, subject sections Ub 
and Uc). 
These historical accounts compare schools of thought over time, typically 
beginning with ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle and the Stoics, and 
ending with 20th century post-materialists. The focus is on the ideas as such, rather 
than on the social forces that shaped these. In this paper, I will follow a different 
approach. I focus on the quantity of research output and analyze the reasons for rise 
and decline in interest in the subject. I start with a classification of notions of 
happiness.  
Notions of ‘happiness’ 
The word 'happiness' is used in various ways. In the widest sense, it is an umbrella 
term for all that is good. In this meaning, it is often used interchangeably with terms 
like 'well-being' or 'quality of life' and denotes both individual and social welfare. This 
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use of words suggests that there is one ultimate good and disguises differences in 
interest between individuals and society. It further suggests that all merits can be 
integrated in one final scale of worth. 
  Quality-of-life concepts can be sorted using two distinctions, which together 
provide a fourfold matrix. I have proposed this classification in an earlier attempt to 
bring order to the many measures used in contemporary quality-of-life research 
(Veenhoven 2000). The first distinction is between chances and outcomes, that is, 
the difference between opportunities for a good life and the good life itself. A second 
difference is between outer and inner qualities of life, in other words between 
'external' and 'internal' features. In the first case, the quality is in the environment, in 
the latter it is in the individual. Lane (1994) makes this distinction clear by 
distinguishing 'quality of society' from 'quality of persons'. The combination of these 
two dichotomies yields a fourfold matrix. This classification is presented in figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
Livability of the environment 
The left top quadrant denotes the meaning of good living conditions, shortly called 
‘livability’.  
 Ecologists see livability in the natural environment and describe it in terms of 
pollution, global warming and degradation of nature. Currently, they associate 
livability typically with preservation of the environment. City planners see livability in 
the built environment and associate it with such things as sewer systems, traffic jams 
and ghetto formation. Here the good life is seen as a fruit of human intervention. In 
the sociological view, society is central. Livability is associated with the quality of 
society as a whole and also with the position one has in society.  
  
Life-ability of the person 
The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we are equipped 
to cope with the problems of life. Sen (1992) calls this quality of life variant 
'capability'. I prefer the simple term 'life-ability', which contrasts elegantly with 
'livability'. 
 The most common depiction of this quality of life is absence of functional 
defects. This is 'health' in the limited sense, sometimes referred to as 'negative 
health'. Next to absence of disease, one can consider excellence of function. This is 
referred to as 'positive health' and associated with energy and resilience.  
  A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective and to 
include acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly denoted by the term 
'self-actualization'. From this point of view a middle-aged man is not 'well' if he 
behaves like an adolescent, even if he functions without problems at this level. Since 
abilities do not develop alongside idleness, this quality of life is close to 'activity' in 
Aristotle's concept of ‘eudemonia’.  
  Lastly, the term 'art of living' denotes special life-abilities; in most contexts, 
this quality is distinguished from mental health and sometimes even attributed to 
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slightly disturbed persons. Art of living is associated with refined tastes, an ability to 
enjoy life and an original style of life. 
Utility of life 
The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be good for 
something more than itself. This assumes some higher values. There is no current 
generic for these external outcomes of life. Gerson (1976: 795) refers to these 
effects as 'transcendental' conceptions of quality of life. Another appellation is 
'meaning of life', which then denotes 'true' significance instead of mere subjective 
sense of meaning. I prefer the simpler 'usefulness of life', while admitting that this 
label may also give rise to misunderstanding. 
 When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its 
functionality for the environment. In this context, doctors stress how essential 
patients lives are to their intimates. At a higher level, quality of life is seen in 
contributions to society. Historians see quality in the addition an individual can make 
to human culture, and rate for example the lives of great inventors higher than those 
of anonymous peasants. Moralists see quality in the preservation of the moral order, 
and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a sinner. As an individual's 
life can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost 
infinite. 
 Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or esthetic value. 
For instance, most of us would attribute more quality to the life of Florence 
Nightingale than to that of a drunk, even if it appeared in the end that her good works 
had some negative results. 
Subjective enjoyment of life 
Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of life. That is the 
quality in the eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious humans, this quality 
boils down to subjective appreciation of life. This is commonly referred using terms 
such as 'subjective wellbeing', 'life-satisfaction' and 'happiness' in a limited sense of 
the word. 
 Humans are capable of evaluating their life in different ways. We have in 
common with all higher animals that we can appraise our situation affectively. We 
feel good or bad about particular things and our mood level signals overall 
adaptation. As in animals, these affective appraisals are automatic, but unlike other 
animals it is known that humans can reflect on this experience. We have an idea of 
how we have felt over the last year, while a cat does not. Humans can also judge life 
cognitively by comparing life as it is with notions of how it should be. 
 Most human evaluations are based on both sources of information, that is: 
intuitive affective appraisal and cognitively guided evaluation. The mix depends 
mainly on the object. Tangible things, such as our income, are typically evaluated by 
comparison; intangible matters, such as sexual attractiveness, are evaluated by how 
one feels. This dual evaluation system probably makes the human experiential 
repertoire richer than that of our fellow-creatures. 
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 In evaluating our life, we typically summarize this rich experience in overall 
appraisals. For instance, we appreciate several domains of life. When asked how we 
feel about our work or our marriage, we will mostly have an opinion. Likewise, most 
people form ideas about separate qualities of their life, for instance, how challenging 
their life is and whether there is any meaning in it. Such judgments are made in 
different time-perspectives, in the past, the present and in the future. Mostly such 
judgments are not very salient in our consciousness. Now and then, they pop to 
mind spontaneously. Though not in the forefront of consciousness all the time, 
estimates of subjective enjoyment of life can be recalled and refreshed when 
needed. This makes these appraisals measurable in principle. 
  Such a subjective evaluation can also concern one’s life as a whole. Bentham 
(1789) referred to such appraisal as ‘the sum of pleasures and pains’ and called it 
‘happiness’. In this paper, I call it ‘life-satisfaction’3. 
 
Past thought on happiness 
  
All above mentioned notions of the good life figure in classic thought, clearly 
because they are all of relevance in the human condition. Emphasis on particular 
notions has varied over time. 
Earlier focus on moral behavior 
Virtue is central in much classic philosophy, probably because most philosophers 
made their living as moral advisors. In that context, personal capabilities such as 
honesty and faith are emphasized (right-top quadrant in figure 1) and also 
manifestations of utility, such as martyrdom (left bottom quadrant). This emphasis on 
moral behavior seems to have been more pronounced in historical conditions where 
morality was at its weakest. 
  Some classic philosophers have also given thought about what makes for a 
good society, such as Plato (380 BC) in his ‘Politeia’ and in the writings of Confucius 
(Veenhoven & Guoquing 2008). This emphasis is typical for developed states and is 
therefore more prominent in contemporary nation states than it has ever been in the 
past. Today, all modern states monitor the quality of the living conditions they 
provide, using sophisticated systems of ‘social indicators’, which are becoming 
increasingly internationalized. 
  Moral philosophers were typically mixed about the worth of subjective 
enjoyment of life. Most accept it as a byproduct of living a good life, rather than a 
manifestation of the good life as such. One reason for this reservation is in their 
professional involvement with moral disciplining. Another reason is probably in the 
poor quality of life in agrarian societies, which appears in historically high rates of 
homicide, poor health, malnutrition, and consequently short lifev.  
                                                          
3 In most of my work I use the word ‘happiness’ in the limited sense of ‘life-satisfaction’. In this paper on 
historical trends, I use the word happiness in the broader meaning of ‘quality of life’ and denote all meanings 
in figure 1. I do so because ‘happiness’ was the keyword in philosophical literature through the ages.  
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Modern emphasis on subjective wellbeing. 
During the dark Middle Ages it was widely believed that happiness was not possible 
in earthly life and that the basis of morality was in the word of God. These views 
were contested in the 18th century ‘Enlightenment’; happiness came to be seen as 
attainable and morality was regarded as man-made. A lively discussion on the 
relation between happiness and morality emerged (Mauzi 1960, Buijs 2007) and in 
this climate an instrumental view on morality appeared, in which ethical codes are 
seen as ways of securing a happy life.  
  Much of this enlightened thought is reflected in Jeremy Bentham’s (1789) 
‘Introduction to morals and legislation’. Bentham argues that the moral quality of 
action should be judged by its consequences on human happiness and in this line, 
he claims that we should aim at the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’. 
Bentham defined happiness in terms of psychological experience, as ‘the sum of 
pleasures and pains’, that is, in the right bottom quadrant of figure 1. His philosophy 
is known as ‘utilitarianism’, because of its emphasis on the utility of behavioral 
consequences. 
 
Rise and decline in scholarly interest in happiness 
 
Though interest in happiness is found in all times, the topic has not always been 
equally prominent in the intellectual discourse. Happiness was a main subject in 
antiquity in western philosophy, but the topic is largely absent in medieval scholarly 
literature.  
 
18th century philosophy 
Happiness was ‘rediscovered’ during the 18th century European Enlightenment. This 
interest reflects in a growing number of publications on happiness in France and The 
Netherlands from 1670 onwards. See Figure 2, in which the number of book-titles 
using the word ‘happiness’ published between 1670 as 1830 is presented. Interest 
peaked around 1800 and then declined in the 19th century.  
     Figure 2 about here 
 
20th century social science 
Interest in happiness revived in the second half of the 20th century, not in the field of 
philosophy, but in the newly established social sciences. In the 1960’s the topic 
appeared as a side-subject in research on successful aging (e.g. Neugarten et al. 
1961) and mental health (e.g. Gurin et al. 1960). In the 1970’s it became a topic in 
social indicators research and in the 1980s in medical quality of life research. Since 
2000, happiness has become a main subject in ‘Positive psychology’ (e.g. 
Lyubomirski 2008) and in ‘Happiness Economics’ (e.g. Bruni et al. 2007). This all has 
resulted in a spectacular rise in the number of scholarly publication on life-
satisfaction, see Figure 3. The red line in Figure 3 shows the number of scientific 
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publications that use the word ‘happiness’ in the title or abstract, and covers all 
meanings of that word distinguished in figure 1. The blue line shows the number of 
publications that deal with subjective satisfaction with life, that is, the meaning 
denoted in the bottom-right quadrant of figure 1.  
  Why these changes in intellectual concern about in happiness? Below I 
review some plausible drivers. 
 
     Figure 3 about here 
Social drivers of scientific interest in happiness 
 
The intellectual agenda is typically not determined in the ivory tower alone, but also 
responds to societal demand. The following social conditions seem to have driven 
demand for information about happiness. 
 
Quality of life 
Intellectual interest in the good life seems to be greatest in good times and in well-
situated social strata; ancient Greek philosophers and Enlighted thinkers fit that 
pattern. One of the mechanisms is that in bad situations the way to a better life is 
pretty evident; escape suffering. This is at least one of the reasons why happiness 
was no great issue in mediaeval thought. Quality of life was at a historical low during 
that stage of societal development (Veenhoven 2010).  
  Likewise, questions on happiness were not the most urgent in the first half of 
the 20th century, when two world wars took place. Interest in happiness surged in the 
second half of the 20th century, an era characterized by prosperity and peace. 
Another mechanism is that good times make people realize that happiness is 
apparently possible during one’s earthly life, and that it makes sense finding out how 
to get more of it. Interest in health has developed in a similar way, we now live longer 
in good health than ever before in human history but are also more concerned with 
health than ever before. 
 
Ideology 
Intellectual interest in happiness is also geared by the ideological climate of the time 
and by the place of competing topics on the political agenda. This is another reason 
why happiness was no topic in the highly religious middle ages when the church set 
the tone.  
  In this vein, one of the reasons for the decline of interest in happiness in the 
19th century can be seen in the emancipation struggles of that era, in which liberals 
called for democracy and socialist for equality. Though both these movements 
rooted in Enlightened thought, emphasis on happiness would not strengthen their 
cause very much, since the conservatives could equally well claim that modernism 
would reduce happiness. Nationalism dominated in first half of the 20th century when 
the two world wars took place, and the nationalists were more interested in national 
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glory than in individual happiness.  
  In this context, the revival of intellectual interest in happiness in the late 20th 
century can be linked to the fact that the above movements had largely reached their 
goals. The liberals had achieved democracy, the socialist had created a welfare 
state and the nationalist had turned global. This ‘end of ideology’ (Bell 1960) created 
room on the political agenda for quality of life issues, such as health and happiness, 
which created an information demand. 
 
Planned society 
The current surge of interest in happiness is also driven by the information demands 
of several institutions in modern planned societies. Social engineers are particularly 
interested in objective information about livability issues, that is, the qualities of life 
denoted in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 1. Social indicators research provides 
data to fill this information need. Strong institutions in the fields of education and 
health care also generate a constant demand for information about life-ability issues, 
denoted by the upper-right quadrant in Figure 1. 
 
Individual freedom 
At the individual level, a driver of scientific interest in happiness is increased fate-
control. Thinking about the good life makes little sense if you cannot change your 
life. Ancient Greek city-states allowed their inhabitants considerable freedom, at 
least for male higher-class citizens and this is one of the reasons why in that era the 
subject of happiness was prominent in the intellectual discourse. 
   Likewise, the emerging nation states of the18th century allowed the 
bourgeoisie unprecedented freedom and this is one of the reasons for the peak in 
books on happiness in this era, shown in Figure 2.  
  Freedom for all increased considerably in the second half of the 20th century, 
when the long-term trend to greater freedom accelerated and the present-day 
individualized multiple-choice-society took shape. This is one of the reasons behinds 
the upsurge of interest in happiness since the 1960s shown in Figure 3. 
 
Informed choice 
A related driver is that the new opportunities to choose call for information on what to 
choose. For example, contraceptive techniques now allow couples to choose 
whether or not they will have children, and many want to know how a particular 
choice will work out on their happiness before making a binding decision. Hence the 
effect of having children on happiness is a common topic in the life-style press, 
which on its turn draw on scientific research.  
  This call for information about the consequences of choice concerns life-
satisfaction in the first place, that is, the quality of life denoted in the bottom-right 
quadrant of Figure 1. Though this information demand manifests in the first place at 
at the micro-level of individuals, interest in life-satisfaction is also rising at the at the 
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meso level of organizations and the macro-level of nations, one of the reasons being 
that happy individuals function better in these contexts (Veenhoven 2015). 
 
Scientific drivers of the present surge in happiness research 
 
Scientific interest wanes in a subject, when no new knowledge can be obtained. This 
seems to have been the case with the subject of happiness in the 19th century. After 
a century of philosophical reflection on happiness, the subject got ‘saturated’. 
  Empirical research gave rise to greater conceptual differentiation than 
armchair theorizing had done in the past, both because measurement pressed to 
greater precision and because findings revealed unexpected differences between 
aspects of the good life. For instance, the classic notion of ‘wisdom’ has crumbled 
into a set of rather loosely related traits (Bergsma & Ardelt 2012). 
  The new quality of life research has also augmented the growing interest in 
subjective appreciation of life, that is, in the quality of life denoted in the right bottom 
quadrant of figure 1. Life satisfaction appeared to be easily measurable in survey 
research, and in fact better measurable than most of the other qualities of life 
mentioned in scheme 1 (Veenhoven 2000). As a result, subjective happiness has 
become a more tangible topic; research shows how happy we are in this sense and 
also indicates how happy we can realistically be. Findings of this kind are well 
covered by the media, which has also augmented the rising prominence of 
subjective well-being in the public debate, this in its turn fuels scientific research. 
 
Future of happiness research 
Will research on happiness continue to grow, or will interest in the subject decline, as 
it did in the 19th century? I foresee further growth of this research strand for the 
following reasons.  
  
Social drivers no less forceful 
The social drivers mentioned above are still in force and are likely to remain in the 
future, if no unforeseen catastrophes happen.  
  Evident sources of unhappiness, such as epidemics and wars, have been 
removed, at least for the time being. Average happiness is high in modern nations 
and is rising steadily (Veenhoven2010). This fosters confidence that greater 
happiness can be achieved but at the same to time it becomes less evident how 
greater happiness can be achieved. An analogy with physical health may illustrate 
this point. Many evident sources of bad health are now under control, such as 
malnutrition, epidemics and unsafe workplaces. As a result, we live now longer in 
good health than ever before in human history. This progress makes us reach out for 
further gains in health, ways which are less evident and require more research, such 
as ways to treat of cancer and achive optimal nutrition. 
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   I do not expect that happiness will fall into disgrace ideologically. The trend in 
value orientation is rather to more emphasis on modern post-material values 
(Inglehart 2008). I not expect either that freedom will decline and that demand for 
knowledge on happiness will therefore diminish. The trend is rather for greater 
opportunities to choose, paralleled by an increasing capacity to make well informed 
choices (Abdur-Rahman & Veenhoven 2017). 
View on scientific progress 
I do not expect that empirical research on happiness will reach a limit of 
understanding any time soon: I rather believe that we are at the beginning of 
discovery.  
  Though we are now well informed about some correlates of happiness (e.g. 
Veenhoven 2017), we are mostly still in the dark about the causal mechanisms 
behind these correlates. Does money buy happiness or does happiness foster 
earning? The diversity in research results is bending the initial search for general 
laws of happiness towards achieving a more fine-grained understanding of 
contingencies, such as in what conditions does money buy happiness for what kind 
of people. 
   New insights are also likely to be obtained using new techniques. Wearable 
electronic devices allow a much closer look at daily experiences of the individual 
than traditional questionnaires do and advances in brain research allow an ever 
better view on the genesis of affective experience and cognitive judgement of life. 
Likewise, advances in gene research promise a better understanding of the genetic 
basis of happiness. 
 
Conclusion 
Scientific attention for happiness has varied over the ages. Attention has surged 
recently and is likely to remain high in the near future. 
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Figure 1 
Four qualities of life 
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Source: Veenhoven 2000 
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Figure 2 
Books on happiness in the Netherlands and France 1670-1830 
Source: Buijs 2007  
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Figure 3 
Scientific publications on ‘happiness’ since 1900 
 
 
Sources: Bibliography of Happiness (Veenhoven 2017a) and Web of Science (Thompson 
Reuters)  
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